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Changes in Equity Risk Perceptions: 
Global Consequences and Policy Responses 
 
ABSTRACT 
       
 
The current weakness in the global economy has generated a debate on the likely outlook for the 
world economy and the appropriate response for monetary policies. The world economy is currently 
being buffeted by a number of major shocks. A particular feature has been the large fall in equity 
markets in many countries. In this paper we use the MSG3 global economic model to assess the 
impact on the global economy of a sharp rise in the equity risk premium in a number of countries. 
In particular we examine whether a rise in equity risk premia (or fall in productivity which has 
many similar implications) is a shock to aggregate supply or aggregate demand. We explore the 
difference in the transmission mechanism if the shocks occur just in one country (i.e. the United 
States) versus across the OECD generally. We then assess the appropriate responses of monetary 
policy to shocks of this type and explore whether there are gains to coordinating the monetary 
policy responses of the G7. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The continuing weakness in the global economy has led to a serious debate about causes and 
remedies. On the one hand have been those who seek to treat it as a downturn similar to other recent 
recessions, in 1975, 1980 - 82, and 1991- 92. These episodes can be thought of as temporary 
demand shocks. Satisfactory management of these would require a speedy cut in real interest rates 
to stimulate demand and lead the economy back close to the NAIRU. On the other hand there have 
been those who treat the current slowdown as a longer term disruption of supply, caused by an 
over-accumulation of particular kinds of capital, a reduction in the rate of productivity growth, an 
increase in the risk premium applied to equity market investment or a bursting of an equity market 
bubble. These kinds of shocks are much harder to manage.  The experience of the earlier downturns 
may provide less guidance to policy makers than many commentators currently argue. 
 
In 2002, the consensus view appeared to be one where the slowdown would be a relatively short-
lived “V” shaped one, with a quite rapid recovery towards full employment, a return of inflation to 
its general target range, and a rise of global interest rates towards long term levels. But this position 
depends at least in part on a view that the slowdown has been caused mainly by a short-term 
demand reduction, which can be partly smoothed by monetary policy, and possibly also by fiscal 
policy. The alternative view is that the downturn is instead a consequence of a reduction in the 
growth of supply potential, either through a revision of productivity growth, or through the 
adjustment to excess investment in information technology or through great uncertainty in the world 
in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, as well as a decline in demand through low 
investment and declines in equity wealth. Such reductions in demand, which have an underlying 
supply-side cause, might be more difficult to smooth. In other words, the current downturn might be 
a shorter-term demand-side feature, which can be managed by policy adjustment, or a more 
structural downturn emerging from longer-term business cycle features, which is more difficult to 
deal with through monetary policy response. 
 
This paper will address this difference of view. We believe that the latter view is the correct 
interpretation of the causes of the downturn, so that the downturn has underlying “supply-side” 
causes due to the ending of the long boom of the 1990s. In this paper we summarize the supply side 
shock through focussing on an increase in the risk premium on equities (but the results are very 
similar to a decline in economy wide TFP growth in that the attractiveness of capital accumulation 
is diminished). But we want to connect the supply shock to the arguments that the world is currently 
experiencing negative demand shocks. The link between the two approaches can be demonstrated 
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through a model which clearly identifies the demand effects of such a supply side shock, through its 
effects in causing a reduction the demand for capital, and thus in investment.  We want to see the 
extent to which such an outcome, coming from the supply side, might nevertheless be possible to 
smooth with appropriate monetary policy on the demand side.  
 
We will focus not only on policy-making in the US but also on the extent to which policy-making in 
Europe, and in the rest of the world, can complement that in the US, and thus on the implications of 
the downturn for policy-making in Europe, Canada and Japan. We will also describe the 
implications of this shock for the developing world, and in particular for regions where the shock 
does not occur but which are affected by the transmission of its consequences.    
 
The paper uses the MSG31 multi-country model.  The key feature of this model is that it combines 
the modern intertemporal optimization approach to modelling economic behaviour (as found in 
Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, and Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996) with short-run rule-of-thumb 
behaviour. In doing this it brings together real business cycle models one the one hand2, which have 
a fully articulated analysis of forward-looking producers and consumers, and modern macro-
econometric models on the other hand, which describe the effects of demand downturns in the face 
of wage (and price) stickiness. The key feature of the model is the way it models asset markets and 
the integration of these markets with real economic activity, in particular the meshing together of 
equity markets and bond markets, joined by highly mobile international flows of financial capital, 
and short-run fixity of physical capital. Other key features of the models are set out in section 3. 
 
Our general findings are striking and have significant implications for present day debates on 
macroeconomic policy.  
 
We find that in response to an increase in global risk (or decline in TFP growth), real wages must 
fall a great deal over time, compared with what they would have been, because of the reduction in 
the capital stock per worker, which occurs because of the increased riskiness of capital. The real 
interest rate must fall to cause demand to rise to make up for the very large reduction in investment 
which this increased riskiness provokes. In the short run, given that aggregate supply falls slowly 
                     
1 The MSG3 model is a 2 sector version of the G-Cubed model developed in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998). It is a 
descendant of the approaches of  the MSG2 model in  McKibbin and Sachs (1991) and the Jorgensen Wilcoxen (1991) 
Model. 
2 See Backus et al (1992). 
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but investment falls sharply, consumption must rise to make up for the reduction in investment; the 
consequence is surprisingly strong consumption, of the kind that has worried many commentators 
as revealing an “imbalance “– we see it as a natural consequence of the kind of shock that we are 
studying. Unemployment emerges, even when monetary policy is expansive enough to induce a rise 
in consumption enough to use up some of the spare resources. Furthermore a significant rise in the 
price of housing – as a consequence of the fall in interest rates and a substitution out of equities into 
other asset classes – is a key part of the way in which consumers’ wealth is raised so as to induce 
the necessary increase in consumption. A corollary of  this is that there is also a boom in the 
production of housing. Again these effects on the housing market have been seen by many 
commentators as an “imbalance” – we see them as a consequence, too, of the shock which we are 
studying. We find that expansionary monetary policy by the monetary policy-maker in each country 
can partly reduce the output loss and resulting unemployment, but only by relatively little. The 
change in these variables affected by policy action, is small relative to the underlying adjustment in 
response to the shock, but they are nonetheless significant in the very short term. Similarly we find 
that international cooperation over monetary policy between policy-makers can further assist with 
reducing the output loss and the resulting unemployment.   
 
2 Model Structure  
 
The MSG3 model is a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium models that attempt to integrate 
the best features of traditional CGE models, real business cycle models and Keynesian macro-
econometric models. A 2 sector stylized version summarizing the key features are outlined in 
Appendix A.  
 
A summary of the key features of the model is contained in Table 1 and the country and sector 
coverage (as well as assumption about exchange rate regimes) is given in Table 2.   
 
The five main features of the model are as follows: 
 
(a) The model is based on explicit optimization by the agents (consumers and firms) in each 
economy. Where these models differ from static CGE models3 is in the assumption of intertemporal 
optimization by economic agents, subject to explicit intertemporal budget constraints. Thus, in 
                     
3 See Hertel (1997) 
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contrast to static CGE models, time and dynamics are of fundamental importance in the MSG3 
models. This makes their core theoretical structures like that of real business cycle models4.  
 
(b) In order to track the macro time series, the behaviour of agents is modified to allow for 
short-run deviations from optimal behaviour, either due to myopia or to restrictions on the ability of 
households and firms to borrow at the risk-free bond rate on government debt.  For both households 
and firms, deviations from intertemporal optimizing behaviour take the form of rules of thumb, 
which are consistent with an optimizing agent that does not update predictions based on new 
information about future events. These rules of thumb are chosen to generate the same steady state 
behaviour as optimizing agents so that in the long run there is only a single intertemporal 
optimizing equilibrium of the model. In the short run, actual behaviour is assumed to be a weighted 
average of the optimizing and the rule of thumb assumptions. Thus, aggregate consumption is a 
weighted average of consumption based on wealth (current asset valuation and expected future after 
tax labour income) and consumption based on current disposable income. This is consistent with the 
econometric results in Campbell and Mankiw (1987) and Hayashi (1982). Similarly, aggregate 
investment is a weighted average of investment based on Tobin’s q (a market valuation of the 
expected future change in the marginal product of capital relative to the cost) and investment based 
on current firm profit-income. 
 
(c) As in all policy-relevant macroeconomic models (but unlike in many CGE models), there is an 
explicit treatment of the holding of financial assets including money. Money is explicitly introduced 
into the model through a restriction that households require money to purchase goods.  This 
assumption gives money an explicit role.  
 
(d)  The model allows for short-run nominal wage rigidity (by different degrees in different 
countries) and therefore allow for significant periods of unemployment depending on the labour 
market institutions in each country. This assumption, when taken together with the explicit role for 
money, is what gives the model its “macroeconomic” characteristics. (Here again the model’s 
assumptions differ from the standard market clearing assumption in most CGE models.)  
 
(e)  The model distinguishes between the stickiness of physical capital within sectors and within 
countries and the flexibility of financial capital, which immediately flows to where expected returns 
                     
4 Se for example Backus et al (1992) 
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are highest. This important distinction leads to a critical difference between the quantity of physical 
capital that is available at any time to produce goods and services, and the valuation of that capital 
as a result of decisions about the allocation of financial capital. 
 
As a result of this structure, the models contain rich dynamic behaviour, driven on the one hand by 
asset accumulation and, on the other hand, by wage adjustment to a neoclassical steady state.  
 
A key point to note is the way household durables, especially housing are incorporated into the 
model.  This is set out in detail in Appendix A. Households are assumed to consume services from a 
stock of durables, which largely consists of housing (from this point we will refer to the entire stock 
of household durable as “housing” as a short-cut).  Investment in housing is determined as part of 
the consumer’s optimization problem under the assumption that housing capital accumulation is 
subject to rising marginal costs of adjustment (similar to that for private capital in production).  In 
other words it takes time for the housing stock to change in response to a change in the demand for 
capital services. Thus surprise increase in demand will lead to capital gains to existing owners of 
housing but gradual adjustment on the supply side. Households buy capital goods from the capital 
goods production sector and add them to the existing stock of capital over time. Households then 
consume a flow of services from the stock of housing over time. 
 
In summary, the model embodies a wide range of assumptions about individual behaviour and 
empirical regularities in a general equilibrium framework. The complex interdependencies are then 
solved out numerically. It is important to stress that the term ‘general equilibrium’ is used here to 
signify that as many interactions are possible are captured, not that the economy is in a full market 
clearing equilibrium at each point in time. Although it is assumed that market forces eventually 
drive the world economy to a neoclassical steady state growth- equilibrium, unemployment does 
emerge for long periods due to wage stickiness, to an extent which differs between countries due to 
differences in  labour market institutions.  
 
The equations for a stylized two-country/two-sector version of the model are presented in Appendix 
A. The theoretical basis of the model can be found in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) and online at 
www.gcubed.com . 
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3 The Shock(s) to be studied 
 
It is important to describe exactly what shock we are implementing in the model. We define the 
equity risk premium as the term µ in equation 1 (this is equation 11 in Appendix A). In this 
equation “i” is the sector number and ‘t’ is period t. Equation (1) shows that the change in λ (which 
is Tobin’s Q adjusted by the relative price of investment goods – see Appendix A) is related to the 
real interest rates adjusted by depreciation and the risk premium, the marginal product of capital 
and a term (quadratic in the rate of investment J/K) capturing the contribution to the marginal cost 
of capital of the adjustment cost of capital.   
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Equation (1) can be interpreted as an arbitrage condition relating returns on equity to returns on 
other real and financial assets and the equity risk premium. Thus we assume that the equity risk 
premium is the excess return on capital relative to the real interest rate adjusted for depreciation and 
allowing for adjustment costs, required to induce people to hold equities relative to government 
bonds with a real interest rate “r”.  A rise in the equity risk premium would mean that either the 
marginal product of capital must rise in the long run or real interest rates must fall or a combination 
of both 
 
Equation (1) can also be integrated and written as the equal to the present value of the after-tax 
marginal product of capital in production (the first term in the integral) plus the savings in 
subsequent adjustment costs it generates. 
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As mentioned above, this demonstrates that λ is similar to Tobin’s marginal Q concept (see 
Appendix A for the transformation by the relative price of investment goods, required to λ required 
to generate Tobin’s Q). 
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There are a number of ways to interpret a rise in the equity risk premium. The first is a rise in the 
current and expected risk premium back to longer-term values away from the low values reached in 
the 1990s at the peak of enthusiasm of the “new Economy”. This can be interpreted as the bursting 
of an equity price bubble. This is potentially a permanent shock if it was expected that the risk 
premium in the 1990s would continue because of fundamental changes in the world economy but 
now these expectations have been fundamentally revised.  Another interpretation is that there has 
been a general rise in uncertainty because of September 11 and other global events, which will not 
necessarily be permanent. To cover these various interpretations we consider a persistent (but 
ultimately temporary) risk shock as well as a permanent shock. The persistent temporary shock 
reflects our most likely guess and is the focus of most of the simulation analysis. 
 
We calibrate the size and duration of the shock in our exercise as follows. Evidence suggests that 
the level of the risk premium had been as high as 8 percent up until the 1980s, and that it steadily 
fell until the late 1990s converging towards zero. In the simulations considered in this paper, we 
take the increase in the risk premium as 5 percent (ie 500 basis points), which reverses 5/8 of the 
fall, which happened in the 1990s. In most of the simulations we take this as dying out over ten 
years. The  risk premium is thus 500 basis points in the first year, 450 basis points higher in the 
second year, 400 basis points higher in the third year, and so on down to 0 basis points in the  11th 
year. For purposes of comparison we also compare the outcomes with what would happen if this 
rise in the risk premium were sustained forever. The shocks commence in the year 2001.  
 
The reason for the choice of a shock lasting ten years is that it lasts long enough to have a 
significant effect on investment and the  capital stock, with consequential effects on the supply 
capacity of the economy. If the shock lasted for only a year or two then this would not be the case. 
And yet the shock gradually dies out and so is not a permanent change: we are not analysing results 
which are the consquences of permanent changes in the stock of capital. But for comparison we 
study what would happen if there were a shock of this size which was permanent.  
 
We apply this shock to all developed OECD countries to study the effects of a rise in the risk 
premium in all developed countries. We also study below what happens if this shock happens only 
in the US. The OECD wide shock is symmetric within the OECD but asymmetric relative to the 
developing countries, which are also in the model. Focussing on results for China give some 
insights on the adjustment of countries outside the OECD.  The results for a US only shock are 
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asymmetric within the OECD, which gives additional information on the nature of the transmission 
of the shock globally. 
 
4 An Outline of Transmission of the Permanent and the Temporary, Symmetric and 
Asymmetric Shock 
 
The relevant features of the model have been explained above. We begin by discussing the effects 
of a permanent rise in the equity risk premium. This provides the background for a discussion at the 
end of this section of the temporary shock. In Section 5 we discuss the appropriate macroeconomic 
policy responses to a temporary rise in the equity risk premium in detail. For both the permanent 
and temporary cases discussed in this Section, monetary policy follows the simple rule of a fixed 
money supply in the US and all other countries, except in the EMU where there is a fixed money 
supply for EMU countries and a monetary union (ie a fixed exchange rate) between the member 
countries, and in China, OPEC and non-oil developing countries which are assumed to be pegging 
to the $US. 
 
4.1 Permanent Shock 
 
We will see that the implications of the permanent shock of 500 basis points are very significant. 
These results demonstrate how important changes in discount rates and risk premia can be for 
economic activity. It is important to stress that the scale of the permanent shock is not meant to 
capture what has happened in the world economy but instead is designed to reveal the underlying 
forces at work in our study below of the temporary shock (which is scaled to represent what we 
believe is a reasonable stylization of what has been happening recently).  
 
Effects on the US 
 
We begin by discussing the effects of a permanent symmetric shock applied to all OECD countries.  
Results for a permanent rise in the equity risk premium and a temporary rise in the equity risk 
premium in all OECD countries are contained in Figure 1. This figure shows the impacts on the 
United States (a country experiencing the shock directly) and China (a country not directly 
experiencing the shock) as examples. China as with all developing countries, is assumed not to 
directly experience the shock. 
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In the face of a permanent risk shock in the industrial countries, firms gradually adjust the stock of 
physical capital to its lower desired level, which depends on (a) the expected productively of capital 
and thus on the extent to which it is expected to yield returns to capital, and (b) on the risk premium 
which investors apply to these returns. The demand for capital depends on Tobin’s q, which in turn 
depends on the ratio of the future changes in the marginal product of capital and real interest rates. 
In the steady state, Tobin’s Q relates marginal product of capital to the sum of the real interest rate, 
the rate of depreciation of capital, and the risk premium. Our shock is to increase the risk premium 
in the way described above, and so leads to a lower q in the short run directly through a higher rate 
for discounting future profitability of firms. As a result investment falls.  
 
The change in the equity risk premium will also have direct effects on consumption. There is a 
decline in the value of capital reflected in a decline in equity values. The expected change in the 
future capital stock will cause a reduction in the value of human capital (the stock of future earnings 
expected to be derived from the application of capital to labour, using a reduced amount of capital). 
To the extent that consumers are forward looking with respect to future labour income and together 
with the fall in the stock market value of wealth this will tend to depress consumption. However, 
there is a rise in the value of other assets such as housing (discussed in detail below). To the extent 
that households are liquidity constrained they will also tend to reduce consumption because income 
has fallen as a result of lower investment. 
 
The immediate impacts of this shock will thus have two components.  
(a) There will be a reduction in aggregate demand during the period during which capital is 
adjusting to the new lower level.  
(b) There is a gradual reduction in supply, caused by the reduction in the stock of capital as a 
result of the lower level of investment.  
 
The reduction in the capital stock is very gradual (although the valuation through equity price falls 
is sharp), and the resulting reduction in supply will therefore be very gradual, too.  
 
How do these impacts impinge on the economy? First, we find that the reduction in demand runs 
ahead of the reduction in supply. This means that there is a long-lasting need, by real interest-rate 
falls, to promote demand – to limiting the reduction in investment, and to cause consumption to rise 
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(even although there are the above-described impact effects causing it to fall).5 Second, prices and 
wages are sticky, because wages are set one period in advance. As a result, changes in demand 
described above, relative to changes in supply, move the economy away from the full utilisation of 
resources. In particular the demand for labour will fall, and there will be unemployment.  
 
Figure 1 presents some of the outcomes for the US. (We do not show the outcomes for any other 
developed country because the results are very similar – we discuss this below). In the following 
discussion the six charts within each figure are referred to as 6a through 6f with 6a in the top left 
hand corner, 6b in the top right hand corner and 6f the bottom right hand corner of the figure. 
 
Figure 1e shows the large and long lasting falls in the real interest rate that result from this 
permanent risk shock.6 The speed at which capital is adjusted down to the new lower level depends 
crucially on costs of adjustment. Figure 1b shows that, even with such a large reduction in the real 
interest rate, a permanent increase in the risk premium of 5 percent would causes a very very large 
reduction in the capital stock in the US – namely 90 percent of GDP (which is equivalent to 
approximately 40 percent since the capital to output ratio is approximately 1.8) and that the 
reduction of the capital stock to its new lower level takes 20 years. This large fall in the capital 
stock is what we expect. Although we start out of steady state, with the capital stock gradually 
adjusting towards steady state, it was doing so along a path consistent with the expected marginal 
product of capital, the long run real interest rate (5%) and depreciation (10%); now it must adjust to 
a new steady state in which the risk premium has risen by 5% (500 basis points). That is an increase 
in the marginal product of capital of one third, and it causes a reduction in the stock of capital of 
                     
5 We will discuss the determinants of, and the behaviour of, consumption below. 
6 It is important to explain the effects on the interest rate. The risk shock will lower the demand for investment and lead 
to a reduced level of capital, and a lower long run level of investment for replacing the depreciation which occurs. In a 
simple Ramsay model something which lowered the stock of capital would lead to a lower human capital and lower 
consumption, just such that lower savings matched the lower investment, and just such that the fall in investment and 
consumption together just matched the fall in output, without any change in the interest rate. However things are 
different here. First, the reduction in the stock of capital is only gradual, so that in the short-to-medium run those 
consumers who are forward-looking see through to time when the capital stock, and output and wages, are already 
lower than they are now. This will tend to reduced consumption and increase savings relative to current level of output, 
lowering the short run. Second, even in the long run the interest rate is affected by the risk premium. At the initial 
interest rate, the risk premium will mean that the stock of capital is lower than it was before, with a lower capital to 
output ratio, and so a lower proportion of output being required to cover depreciation. If the interest rate stayed as 
before, the proportion of income saved would remain as before [footnote -  for forward-looking consumers – that seems 
a correct claim about intertemporal choice], [in long run backward looking consumers do not save, but the proportion of 
such consumers is unchanged]. So savings would be higher than investment. Hence  proportion of the wedge imposed 
by the risk premium must fall on the interest rate. 
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more than twice that amount because the production function is not Cobb Douglas and has an 
elasticity of substitution of less than unity. Over time the changes in capital change the supply 
potential of the economy.  
 
Figure 1a shows what happens, as a result of the shock to employment. If wages and prices were 
perfectly flexible there would not be unemployment like this. Figure 1a shows that, in response to 
this shock, there would be a reduction of employment, which reaches a maximum of close to 10 
percent, before real wage flexibility eliminates it. Eventually unemployment is removed by a fall in 
the real wage of close to 9% (relative to baseline). As we will see later, there is a role for monetary 
policy in intervening to smooth the unemployment consequences of these shocks. 
 
Figure 1c shows the negative effect on GDP in the US. Although in the short run this is influenced 
by unemployment, eventually it is determined by the reduction in supply caused by the reduction in 
the capital stock. We see that, within 20 years, the reduction in output is very large at –23 percent 
(relative to base). It is useful to compare this with the fall in the capital stock, which as noted above 
falls close to 90 percent of GDP, which is equivalent to a percentage fall of approximately 50 
percent. The ratio of the proportionate fall in output to the proportionate fall in capital is about 45 
percent because capital is only one of the factors of production, which will in equilibrium become 
more labour intensive. The ratio is more than the capital share of about one third, which is what is 
what would be expected if the production function was Cobb Douglas 
 
Overall we can see that such a shock, if it were permanent, would have a very large effect on the US 
economy as well as on other OECD economies (not shown here). There would be a long-lasting fall 
in output. This would be as a result of a very long lasting reduction in the investment demand for 
capital, and a permanent reduction in its supply.  
 
Effects in other OECD countries 
 
If such a permanent shock were confined to a single economy then this reduction in the real interest 
rate will have significant consequences for the exchange rate, and consequently implications for the 
trade balance. If the OECD economies are sufficiently symmetrical then there are no large 
movements of this kind (see Figures 1d and 1f). There are some inter-country differences within 
Europe which are discussed below. 
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Effects in Developing Countries 
 
Figure 1 also plots the outcomes for China, which is not directly experiencing the OECD-wide 
shock. In the face of the sustained fall in world interest rates, China experiences a significant 
increase in investment and rise in the capital stock and a significant increase in GDP (5% initially). 
This also causes a long-lasting boom to employment in China. The Chinese real exchange rate 
appreciates as capital flows into China and real interest rates fall significantly (note than the 
nominal exchange rate is pegged to the $US). The Chinese economy runs a large current account 
deficit with advanced countries reflecting the large capital inflow. However there are quickly 
diminishing returns to the additional capital because the adjustment costs are proportional to the 
rate of investment. The transmission to China (and other developing countries) shows that increased 
growth in unaffected economies is one way in which the shocks to the world caused by risk shocks 
are moderated. The real exchange rate of China eventually depreciates significantly, to prevent the 
current account deficit, caused by higher growth, from causing external asset liabilities to explode 
without limit.  The real depreciation and higher income enable the external liabilities to be services 
through rising exports relative to imports over time. 
 
4.2 Temporary Shock 
   
Figure 1 also shows results for a temporary risk shock, of the same size (500 basis points), but 
which gradually fades out over 10 years. The real interest rate falls in the first three years by nearly 
three quarters of its fall in the permanent case. Although the capital stock eventually returns to base, 
after more than 20 years, it falls in the first ten years by more than 15 percent of GDP. GDP is down 
by about 5 percent after ten years, before recovering.  
 
Overall we can see that such a shock, if it were temporary rather than permanent, would still have 
considerable effects on the global economy. The outcomes shown would not actually cause a 
recession (change in growth rates can be calculated from the slopes of the GDP graph which is 
deviations from baseline). But they would cause a very long-lasting reduction in the growth rate of 
output of approaching half a percent per year, for up to 10 years. This is as a drawn out (over ten 
years) reduction in the investment demand for capital, and a permanent reduction in the supply 
capacity of the economy for nearly 10 years. Employment is close to 2.5 percent lower during the 
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transition.  
 
4.3 US versus OECD-Wide Shock 
 
Figure 2 contains the results for the United States and China comparing the results for the 
temporary shock in the OECD with the US only shock. The results for the temporary OECD-wide 
shock are the same as that for the temporary shock in figure 1, however removing the permanent 
shock from the graphs changes the scale significantly. The ‘S’ next to each country indicates a 
symmetric shock (OECD wide) whereas the A signifies an asymmetric shock (US only).   
 
The underlying economic story of the results has already been outlined above. The main point of 
these results in Figure 2 is to show that the effect on the US is overwhelmingly the change in the 
US risk premium. The results differ more for the US current account, which under a US only shock 
improves by three times the amount compared to the OECD wide shock. Similarly the real 
exchange rate changes are three times the magnitude when the shock only occurs in the United 
States compared to the OECD-wide shock. It is not surprising that the asymmetric shocks show up 
in the bilateral variables between countries. 
 
For China it is clear that the impact on GDP and the capital stock is more than double under the 
OECD wide shock than under the US only shock. The reallocation of global capital is that much 
larger when all industrial economies experience the risk shock compared to when the US only 
experiences the shock. Also the movement in the Chinese real exchange rate is more than double 
for the OECD wide shock. 
 
4.4 Detailed macroeconomic adjustment within the United 
 
In figure 3 we present more detailed results on the adjustments that occur within the US economy 
for the OECD wide temporary risk premium shock. We assume in this and earlier figures that the 
simple monetary regime in place is a fixed money supply rule. The remainder of the results in this 
paper will examine optimal money rules but for diagnostic purposes it is useful to begin with the 
fixed money stock assumption of the basic IS/LM framework. 
 
Figure 3a shows the behaviour of the major macroeconomic aggregates, all for the US. Figure 3b 
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shows the behaviour of major assets – value of capital (i.e. qK), government bonds, foreign assets, 
human capital, and wealth.  Figure 3c shows what happens to employment and inflation of both 
consumer and producer prices and Figure 3d shows outcomes for the levels of wages and consumer 
and producer prices; it thus depicts a large fall in real wages of around 9 percent; during the period 
that capital is down it is this which prices workers back in to jobs and reduces the resulting 
unemployment. Figure 3e shows asset prices including the interest rate and Tobin’s Q for capital 
used in production and Tobin’s Q in housing capital. Figure 3f shows the real exchange rate, all for 
the US. 
 
We have already explained the overall macroeconomic adjustment story to the change in the equity 
risk premium. The required return to capital rises due to the higher risk premium on equities. This 
causes a large fall in the US share market, summarized in the Asset Price Chart under Tobin’s Q. 
Note in this chart that although the stock market falls sharply there is an equally sharp rise in the 
Tobin’s Q for housing. People substitute out of equities into other assets such as government debt 
driving up the price of debt and therefore driving down the real interest rate. They also substitute 
into consumer durables (primarily housing) in this model. The combination of this substitution plus 
the fall in real interest rates increases the Q for housing further. Because the stock of housing, like 
the stock of physical capital is costly to adjust, the result is a rise in the price of housing and a rise 
in the return to investing in housing.  This lasts for 5 years even though the shock is temporary. 
 
The role of consumption and of housing 
 
Figure 3a also shows that consumption actually rises slightly as a result of the shock. But we have 
already noted that forward looking consumers will see the future productive power of labour as 
being lower as a result of the falling capital stock, which will lead to a fall in the value of real 
wages. Those consumers who are forward-looking will see the fall in future income and the value of 
equities and will cut consumption accordingly. How then is the rise in consumption brought about 
in the face of this by the falling rate of interest? 
 
The fall in the real interest rate has two consequences for wealth. 
(i) Human capital rises (See Figure 3b). This happens, even despite the reduction in the 
real wage (See Figure 3d), because a fall in the interest rate increases the discounted value of 
any real income.  
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(ii) The value of existing houses rises. This is reflected by the rise in the value of 
Tobin’s q for housing (see Figure 3e). It happens for two reasons. First the rise in the 
risk premium through the fall in the real interest rate, increases the present 
discounted value of housing services, causing the value of existing houses to rise. 
Second the relative price of producing new housing falls. This is because the price of 
investment goods falls (relative to the price of other produced goods), because of the 
reduction in the demand for investment. That makes new housing cheaper, because it 
is produced in a way which is intensive in the use of investment goods, and that 
increases the value of existing housing. 
 
The rise in human capital and in the value of housing, together mean that the value of overall wealth 
initially goes up (See Figure 3b). This happens even though the productive potential of the economy 
has fallen, and even although the value of financial wealth will have fallen significantly with the fall 
in the value of the stock market (see the fall in Tobin’s q (non-energy) in Figure 3e).   
 
The resulting rise in the value of wealth can then explain the rise in consumption on goods. 
Furthermore, because of the increase in Tobin’s q for housing there is an increase in expenditure on 
housing itself, which is part of consumption.  
 
Thus the fall in the interest rate actually more than overturns the negative effects, mentioned above, 
of falling capital stock leading to fall in consumption (because forward looking consumers foresee 
falling output). That is why consumption goes up even although the productivity of the economy – 
at least for a period of time – will actually have fallen. The role of a rise in house prices, and a rise 
in expenditure on housing, is essential in limiting the negative consequences of this shock. 
 
In summary, Figure 3a shows a sharp fall in real investment but a rise in private consumption. This 
helps dampen the GDP decline, which is largely driven by falling investment. The GDP decline is 
also partly offset because of a real depreciation of the $US is effective terms. Europe and the rest of 
the OECD are also experiencing the shock thus most of the change in real exchange rates is relative 
to developing countries. If the shock only occurred in the US the exchange rate change would be 
larger and the trade balance improvement is larger helping to dampen the negative effects of the 
shock.  
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An important insight from these results is that the more the equity risk shock is a global event the 
greater the negative impacts on the affected countries because there is less ability to buffer the 
shock through balance of payments adjustment. Also the role of other assets in the economy, 
especially housing is important in understanding the transmission of the shock within an economy. 
 
 
 
5 Macroeconomic Policy and Outcomes 
 
In this section investigate the effects of a policymaker pursuing not a fixed money supply, but 
instead adjusting interest rates so that the outcome optimises an intertemporal loss function7 shown 
in equation (3). 
 
(3) Wit =  Σ∝t=0 δt    τit'Ωiτit  
 
Assume that a policymaker chooses a vector of control variables (Uit) to minimize (3) subject to the 
structure of the world economy as given by the MSG3 model.  Where τ is a vector of targets (in the 
current case either inflation alone or inflation and employment) relative to desired levels, Ω is a 
matrix of weights on each target included in the τ vector, and the ‘i’ subscript refers to country i. 
 
It is important to note that we assume the policy maker cares not about the gap between actual 
output and capacity output, but about the gap between actual and desired employment. We use 
employment rather than capacity output because our shock is making capacity output change 
endogenously, and to fall. A policy maker who pursued the previously projected capacity level of 
output would create an inflation bias. Whereas employment will return to its natural rate within the 
model over time and this eliminates the inflation bias. 
 
A second, important aspect of the objective function is that we make the inflation part of the 
objective function, producer price inflation rather than consumer price inflation. We do this because 
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of the strong effects the change in the price of housing services have on the measure of consumer 
price level in this model. The producer price index is closer to the concept of inflation used in the 
conventional macroeconomics literature as it turns out the particular shock we are examining in this 
paper leads to a substantial change in the price of housing services which monetary authorities may 
not want to respond to. Housing services and their pricing is something less than fully captured in 
most actual measures of the CPI and we do not want to entangle our results with this effect.   
 
(i) United States 
 
Figure 4 shows results for the United States under the case where monetary authorities put all 
weight on inflation (INFP) relative to the case where a weight of 2 is put on inflation a 1 on 
employment deviation from desired (INFEMP). If the policymaker puts double the weight on 
inflation as on employment and optimises monetary policy on this basis, the real outcomes for the 
US economy are very similar over time – almost identical - to those with a fixed money supply. 
Although in the initial years there are significant differences. The scale of the graphs and the long 
time period tend to disguise the monetary impacts in the very short term.  Note in Figure 4b that 
producer price inflation is targeted exactly in the INF regime but is allowed to fluctuate relative to 
desired when allowance is also made for deviations in employment from desired (figure 1a). 
 
If the policy maker puts an infinite relative weight on inflation (i.e. two relative to zero on 
employment) we see that output and employment outcomes of the shock can be made “worse” – i.e. 
more severe. Employment falls more (i.e. unemployment rises more), because monetary policy is 
tighter. However notice that nominal interest rates are lower under the inflation target. This is 
because when employment is given some weight in the targeting, inflation is higher and thus the 
inflation premium in the nominal interest rate is higher. The key point is that the real interest rate is 
higher under inflation targeting and therefore monetary policy is tighter in this case.  
 
We see two things from this section.  
 
The first of these is as expected, and obvious. A looser monetary can reduce the unemployment 
costs of the shock. In more detail, we see that this is a shock which, during the period in which its 
                                                                    
7 Recent studies following this approach using the MSG2 model to focus on policy issues within 
Europe include Haber at al (2001) , Haber et al (2002) and Neck et al (2002) 
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negative effects on the capital stock remain present, requires a significant fall in the real wage. To 
bring these about by wage cuts, without any rise in the price level, requires a significant amount of 
unemployment. The unemployment required to produce the wage cuts can be reduced by having 
some inflation.  
 
The second result is less obvious, and important. This is that a more expansionary monetary policy, 
even a very expansionary monetary policy does not seem to be able to make very much difference 
to the level of unemployment along the long period of transition but does make a difference in the 
very short run. The downturn caused by the risk shock seems to be in large part a downturn – lower 
output and lower employment - that is hard to change greatly by monetary policy. To a considerable 
extent it is a supply side phenomenon which cannot be changed much by monetary policy and 
comes from the reduction in supply potential caused by the reduction in the stock of capital. Instead 
it is due to the fact that wages are sufficiently flexible in this model that a change in monetary 
policy, although it can have an effect for a few years before it is reflected in wages, cannot do so for 
more than a few years, no matter how large it is because any future changes will quickly feed into 
wages.  
 
(ii) France 
 
To illustrate the transmission of the shock to other countries we next present results for an 
illustrative European country, France. Figure 5 contains results when the shock is an OECD wide 
shock including in France but with the optimal policy response (with the European wide inflation 
and employment in the European Central Bank’s objective function). This can be compared with 
Figure 6, which also contains results for France but in the case where the shock only occurs in the 
United States. 
 
The macroeconomic adjustment in France when there is an OECD-wide risk shock is very similar 
to that for the United States that has already been analyzed in figure 3. The major difference is the 
smaller change in the Euro relative to the dollar and therefore the less offset there is for French 
GDP from an improvement in net exports. Indeed exports fall much more in France than in the US. 
The nominal effective exchange rate changes little in France compared to the US. Also there is a 
much larger rise in prices in France since the ECB is targeting European wide variables it does not 
place a great deal of weight on French inflation. This implies a rise in nominal wages in France 
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compared to a fall in nominal wages in the US. There is also a much more persistent rise in prices in 
France because of the ECB’ reaction. 
 
When the shock occurs in the United States only, France faces a very different type of shock. Recall 
that the US shock reduced US real interest rates and causes a global reallocation of capital. 
Financial capital flows into Europe as a whole, which appreciates the Euro. Asset prices are also 
driven up in Europe and real interest rates fall due to the inflow of capital from the United States. 
Asset values also rise and there is a physical accumulation of capital. Employment rises above base 
as the European economy experiences a positive supply shock due to the capital reallocation, but a 
negative foreign demand shock due to the slowdown in the US economy. The net effect is positive 
for Europe both in terms of higher employment as well as lower inflation. This contrasts with the 
stagflationary effect of the own country shock.  If is worth pointing out that there is no direct 
control over French inflation because the ECB is targeting European wide inflation and 
employment. Therefore prices and wages in France rise over time.  
 
  
7 International Cooperation between Policy Makers 
 
We finally study international cooperation between policymakers.  We solve for the non-
cooperative (time consistent) Nash equilibrium in which policy makers solve the objective function 
summarized in the previous section taking as given the behaviour of other policymakers.  We also 
solve the cooperative equilibrium where a global policymaker weights each country’s objective 
function by that country’s GDP relative to the group and sets policy appropriately. This follows the 
techniques outlined in McKibbin and Sachs (1991) 
 
An important innovation here is, as in the previous section, making the policy makers care not 
about the gap between actual output and capacity output, but instead about employment. We did 
this in the previous section to avoid the policy makers introducing an inflation bias. To do so is 
doubly important in this section because we know from Rogoff (1985) that if policymakers have an 
inflation bias then cooperation between them can be welfare reducing since it enables them to avoid 
depreciating the real exchange rate when they expand individually and thus strengthens the 
temptation to each to exploit inflation bias by attempting to over-expand.  
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In such a setup we expect there to be a cooperation issue. In particular the attempts by the 
individual policymakers to get demand back to supply by expansionary monetary policy makers 
partly limited by the fact that this would cause the exchange rate to depreciate and cause inflation. 
Cooperation will enable them to avoid this and so to be more expansionary, (even although they do 
not have an inflation bias and would not seek to expand as and when the economy had returned to 
full employment).  
 
Figure 7 shows results, which conform to this expected outcome. Cooperation gives a more 
expansionary response to the shock. It enables the policy makers to trade off lost output for higher 
inflation. These results mirror the results from the literature of the 1980s when policy cooperation 
was shown to avoid excessively contractionary responses to inflationary shocks8. Here we show 
that cooperation enables more expansionary (and more inflationary) responses to negative demand 
shocks.  
 
But the results, although of the expected sign, are highly important in that they are small. They 
suggest, just like the studies from the 1980s, that the effects of cooperation would be very limited. 
This is because a more expansionary monetary policy induced by cooperation, does not seem to be 
able to make very much difference to the level of unemployment resulting from the shock that we 
are studying. As already noted, the downturn caused by the risk shock seems to be in large part a 
downturn – lower output and lower employment - which is hard to change greatly by monetary 
policy. To a considerable extent it is a supply side phenomenon which cannot be changed much by 
monetary policy and comes from the reduction in supply potential caused by the reduction in the 
stock of capital. Monetary cooperation in these circumstances (compared to the country following 
their own optimal policies) seems unlikely to be able to yield much benefit. In reality however it is 
not clear that countries are currently following optimal policies individually. To the extent that 
cooperation might move them away from the currently inappropriate policies such as in Japan and 
Europe, cooperation might have much larger payoffs than simulated in the artificial world of this 
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modelling exercise. 
 
8 Conclusions.  
 
We find that the global adjustment to shifts in equity risk premia is significant. They 
comprise both demand and supply side shocks and therefore are difficult to manage with monetary 
policies. We find that what some commentators regards as imbalances such as shifts in current 
accounts and changes in housing prices can be explained as optimal responses to the types of 
shocks being experienced (although the actual changes observed might be larger than optimal, the 
direction of change is consistent with the adjustment in this paper). Adjusting monetary policies to 
deal with these ‘imbalances’ would be counterproductive. There is a role for monetary policy in 
smoothing the adjustment on the demand side relative to the adjustment on the supply side, however 
monetary policy cannot offset the underlying supply side consequences of the shock. 
The transmission of equity shocks has important implication for countries not experiencing 
the shock both within the OECD and within the developing world. The supply side of countries not 
experiencing the equity risk shocks will tend to be positively affected but external demand declines. 
The negative external demand shock but positive domestic supply shock induced by foreign capital 
inflow is very different to the experience of the affected countries which experience domestic 
supply and demand contractions. The optimal adjustment of policy in different countries is therefore 
likely to differ across countries. 
We have taken the changes to equity risk to be completely external to the model. This is 
might be unsatisfactory since risk perceptions may in fact be endogenous to the policy responses. 
The determinations of risk assessment, is an important area of research that needs a great deal of 
research.  We have also ignored the role of fiscal policy, which may have importantly different 
effects than monetary policy. Haber et al (2001,2002) have already demonstrated the importance of 
this issue within Europe. Future work will extend the current analysis to the topic of this paper.  
                                                                    
8 see McKibbin (1997) for a survey of these results. 
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Table 1: Key Features of the Model  
 Specification of the demand and supply sides of  economies; 
 Integration of real and financial markets of these economies with explicit arbitrage linkage 
real and financial rates of return; 
 Intertemporal accounting of stocks and flows of real resources and financial assets; 
 Imposition of intertemporal budget constraints so that agents and countries cannot forever 
borrow or lend without undertaking the required resource transfers necessary to service 
outstanding liabilities; 
 Short-run behavior is a weighted average of neoclassical optimizing behavior based on 
expected future income streams and Keynesian current income; 
 The real side of the model is dis-aggregated to allow for production of multiple goods and 
services within  economies; 
 International trade in goods, services and financial assets; 
 Full short-run and long-run macroeconomic closure with macro dynamics at an annual 
frequency around a long-run Solow/Swan/Ramsey neoclassical growth model. 
 The model is solved for a full rational expectations equilibrium at an annual frequency from 
2001 to 2070. 
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Table 2: The MSG3 Model version 50o 
Countries:     Exchange rate Regime: 
United States     float 
Japan      float 
Australia     float 
Canada      float 
United Kingdom    float 
Germany     Euro (floating) 
Austria      Euro (floating) 
France      Euro (floating) 
Italy       Euro (floating) 
Rest of Euro Zone     Euro (floating) 
Rest of OECD    float 
China      peg to $US 
non Oil Developing countries  peg to $US 
Eastern Europe and Russia   float 
OPEC      peg to $US 
Sectors: 
Energy 
Non – Energy 
Capital goods producing sector 
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Appendix I: A stylized 2 country G-Cubed model 
In this section a stylized 2-country model is presented which distils the essence of the MSG3 
model (a 2 sector version of the G-Cubed model) and in particular how the intertemporal aspects of 
the model are handled. The reader is referred to McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) for greater detail. 
In this stylized model there are 2 symmetric countries. Each country consists of several 
economic agents: households, the government, the financial sector and 2 firms, one each in the 2 
production sectors. The two sectors of production are energy and non-energy (this is much like the 
aggregate structure of the MSG2 model).  The following gives an overview of the theoretical 
structure of the model by describing the decisions facing these agents in one of these countries. 
Throughout the discussion all quantity variables will be normalized by the economy's endowment 
of effective labor units.  Thus, the model's long run steady state will represent an economy in a 
balanced growth equilibrium. 
Firms 
We assume that each of the two sectors can be represented by a price-taking firm which 
chooses variable inputs and its level of investment in order to maximize its stock market value. 
Each firm’s production technology is represented by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function.  Output is a function of capital, labor, energy and materials: 
(1)  ( ) 
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where Qi is the output of industry i, xij is industry i's use of input j, and Aio, oijδ , and σio  are 
parameters. Aio reflects the level of technology, σio  is the elasticity of substitution, and the oijδ  
parameters reflect the weights of different inputs in production; the superscript o indicates that the 
parameters apply to the top, or “output”, tier.  Without loss of generality, we constrain the oijδ 's to 
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sum to one. 
 
 The goods and services purchased by firms are, in turn, aggregates of imported and domestic 
commodities which are taken to be imperfect substitutes.  We assume that all agents in the economy 
have identical preferences over foreign and domestic varieties of each commodity.  We represent 
these preferences by defining composite commodities that are produced from imported and 
domestic goods.  Each of these commodities, Yi, is a CES function of inputs domestic output, Qi, 
and an aggregate of goods imported from all of the country’s trading partners, Mi: 
(2)  ( ) ( ) )1/(/)1(/1/)1(/1 −−− 


 +
fd
i
fd
ifd
i
fd
i
fd
i
fd
i
fd
i
fd
i
i
fd
ifi
fd
id
fd
ii MQ A = y
σσ
σσσσσσ δδ    
where σifd is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.9   For example, the 
energy product purchased by agents in the model are a composite of imported and domestic energy. 
 The aggregate imported good, Mi, is itself a CES composite of imports from individual countries, 
Mic, where c is an index indicating the country of origin: 
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The elasticity of substitution between imports from different countries is σiff.   
 
 By constraining all agents in the model to have the same preferences over the origin of 
goods we require that, for example, the agricultural and service sectors have the identical 
preferences over domestic oil and imported oil.10  This accords with the input-output data we use 
and allows a very convenient nesting of production, investment and consumption decisions. 
 
                     
9 This approach follows Armington (1969). 
10 This does not require that both sectors purchase the same amount of oil, or even that they purchase oil at all; only 
that they both feel the same way about the origins of oil they buy. 
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In each sector the capital stock changes according to the rate of fixed capital formation (Ji) 
and the rate of geometric depreciation  (δi): 
(4)  k  J = k iiii δ−&  
Following the cost of adjustment models of Lucas (1967), Treadway (1969) and Uzawa (1969) we 
assume that the investment process is subject to rising marginal costs of installation.  To formalize 
this we adopt Uzawa's approach by assuming that in order to install J units of capital a firm must 
buy  a larger quantity, I, that depends on its rate of investment (J/k): 
(5)  J 
k
J+ = I i
i
ii
i 



2
1
φ
 
where φi is a non-negative parameter.  The difference between J and I may be interpreted various 
ways; we will view it as installation services provided by the capital-goods vendor.  Differences in 
the sector-specificity of capital in different industries will lead to differences in the value of φi. 
 
The goal of each firm is to choose its investment and inputs of labor, materials and energy to 
maximize intertemporal net-of-tax profits.  For analytical tractability, we assume that this problem 
is deterministic (equivalently, the firm could be assumed to believe its estimates of future variables 
with subjective certainty).  Thus, the firm will maximize:11 
(6)  dse  Ip   tsn) sRi
I
4i
t
)()(())1(( −−−
∞
−−∫ τπ  
where all variables are implicitly subscripted by time.  The firm’s profits, π, are given by: 
(7)  ))(1( xpxpxwQp = im
m
iie
e
iilii
*
i2i −−−−τπ  
where τ2 is the corporate income tax, τ4 is an investment tax credit, and p* is the producer price of 
                     
11 The rate of growth of the economy's endowment of effective labor units, n, appears in the discount factor because 
the quantity and value variables in the model have been scaled by the number of effective labor units.  These variables 
must be multiplied by exp(nt) to convert them back to their original form. 
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the firm’s output. R(s) is the long-term interest rate between periods t and s: 
(8)  dvvr 
ts
 = sR
s
t
)(1)( ∫−  
Because all real variables are normalized by the economy's endowment of effective labor units, 
profits are discounted adjusting for the rate of growth of population plus productivity growth, n.  
Solving the top tier optimization problem gives the following equations characterizing the firm’s 
behavior: 
(9)  ( ) m}e,{l,j
p
p
QAx
o
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i
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where λi is the shadow value of an additional unit of investment in industry i.   
 
Equation (9) gives the firm’s factor demands for labor, energy and materials and equations 
(10) and (11) describe the optimal evolution of the capital stock.  Integrating (11) along the 
optimum trajectory of investment and capital accumulation, ))(ˆ),(ˆ( tktJ , gives the following 
expression for λi: 
(12)  ∫
∞ −+−
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Thus, λi is equal to the present value of the after-tax marginal product of capital in production (the 
first term in the integral) plus the savings in subsequent adjustment costs it generates.  It is related 
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to q, the after-tax marginal version of Tobin's Q (Abel, 1979), as follows: 
(1)  ( ) p = q I
i
i
41 τ
λ
−
 
Thus we can rewrite (10) as: 
(2)  ( )11 −q =
k
J i
ii
i
φ  
Inserting this into (5) gives total purchases of new capital goods: 
(3)  ( ) ii
i
i kqI 12
1 2 −= φ  
Based on Hayashi (1979), who showed that actual investment seems to be party driven by 
cash flows, we modify (3) by writing Ii as a function not only of q, but also of the firm's current 
cash flow at time t, πi, adjusted for the investment tax credit: 
(4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) Iiiiii pkqI 4222 11121 τπαφα −−+−=  
This improves the model’s ability to mimic historical data and is consistent with the existence of 
firms that are unable to borrow and therefore invest purely out of retained earnings. 
 
So far we have described the demand for investment goods by each sector.  Investment 
goods are supplied, in turn, by a third industry that combines labor and the outputs of other 
industries to produce raw capital goods.  We assume that this firm faces an optimization problem 
identical to those of the other two industries: it has a nested CES production function, uses inputs of 
capital, labor, energy and materials in the top tier, incurs adjustment costs when changing its capital 
stock, and earns zero profits. The key difference between it and the other sectors is that we use the 
investment column of the input-output table to estimate its production parameters.   
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Households 
Households have three distinct activities in the model: they supply labor, they save, and they 
consume goods and services. Within each region we assume household behavior can be modeled by 
a representative agent with an intertemporal utility function of the form: 
(1)  dsesg +sc = U t-s-
t
t
)())(ln)((ln θ∫
∞
 
where c(s) is the household's aggregate consumption of goods and services at time s, g(s) is 
government consumption at s, which we take to be a measure of public goods provided, and θ is the 
rate of time preference.12 The household maximizes (1) subject to the constraint that the present 
value of consumption be equal to the sum of human wealth, H, and initial financial assets, F:13 
(1)  tt
t
tsnsRc FHescsp +=∫
∞ −−− ))()(()()(  
Human wealth is defined as the expected present value of the future stream of after-tax labor 
income plus transfers: 
(1)  ( ) dseTRL+L+L+LW- = H tsnsR
i
iICG
t
t
)()(
12
1
1 ))()(1( −−−
=
∞
+∑∫ τ  
where τ1 is the tax rate on labor income, TR is the level of government transfers, LC is the quantity 
of labor used directly in final consumption, LI is labor used in producing the investment good, LG is 
government employment, and Li is employment in sector i.  Financial wealth is the sum of real 
money balances, MON/P, real government bonds in the hand of the public, B, net holding of claims 
against foreign residents, A, the value of capital in each sector: 
(2)  kq+kq+kq+A+B+p
MON = F ii
=i
ccII ∑12
1
 
                     
12 This specification imposes the restriction that household decisions on the allocations of expenditure among different 
goods at different points in time be separable. 
13 As before, n appears in (1) because the model's scaled variables must be converted back to their original basis. 
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 Solving this maximization problem gives the familiar result that aggregate consumption 
spending is equal to a constant proportion of private wealth, where private wealth is defined as 
financial wealth plus human wealth: 
(1)  )( H+F = cpc θ  
However, based on the evidence cited by Campbell and Mankiw (1990) and Hayashi (1982) we 
assume some consumers are liquidity-constrained and consume a fixed fraction γ of their after-tax 
income (INC).14  Denoting the share of  consumers who are not constrained and choose 
consumption in accordance with (1) by α8, total consumption expenditure is given by: 
(2)  INC + H+F= cp tt
c γαθα )1()( 88 −  
The share of households consuming a fixed fraction of their income could also be interpreted as 
permanent income behavior in which household expectations about income are myopic. 
 
Once the level of overall consumption has been determined, spending is allocated among 
goods and services according to a CES utility function.15  The demand equations for capital, labor, 
energy and materials can be shown to be: 
(3)  { }melki
p
pyxp
o
c
i
c
c
i
c
ii ,,,,
1
∈


=
−σ
δ  
where y is total expenditure, xic is household demand for good i, σco is the top-tier elasticity of 
substitution and the δic are the input-specific parameters of the utility function.  The price index for 
consumption, pc, is given by: 
                     
14 There has been considerable debate about the empirical validity of the permanent income hypothesis.  In addition the 
work of Campbell , Mankiw and Hayashi, other key papers include Hall (1978), and Flavin (1981). One side effect of 
this specification is that it prevents us from computing equivalent variation.  Since the behavior of some of the 
households is inconsistent with (1), either because the households are at corner solutions or for some other reason, 
aggregate behavior is inconsistent with the expenditure function derived from our utility function. 
15 The use of the CES function has the undesirable effect of imposing unitary income elasticities, a restriction usually 
rejected by data.  An alternative would be to replace this specification with one derived from the linear expenditure 
system. 
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Household capital services consist of the service flows of consumer durables plus residential 
housing.  The supply of household capital services is determined by consumers themselves who 
invest in household capital, kc, in order to generate a desired flow of capital services, ck, according 
to the following production function: 
(1)  ck k = c α  
where α is a constant.  Accumulation of household capital is subject to the condition: 
(2)  k  J =k cccc δ−&  
We assume that changing the household capital stock is subject to adjustment costs so household 
spending on investment, Ic, is related to Jc by: 
(3)  J
k
J
2
 + 1 = I cc
cc
c 


 φ  
Thus the household's investment decision is to choose IC to maximize: 
(4)  ∫
∞ −−−−
t
tsnsRcIcck dseIpkp ))()(()( α  
where pck is the imputed rental price of household capital.  This problem is nearly identical to the 
investment problem faced by firms and the results are very similar. The only important differences 
are that no variable factors are used in producing household capital services and there is no 
investment tax credit for household capital.  Given these differences, the marginal value of a unit of 
household capital, λC, can be shown to be: 
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where the integration is done along the optimal path of investment and capital accumulation, 
))(ˆ),(ˆ( tktJ cc .  Marginal q is: 
(1)  
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and investment is given by: 
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The Labor Market 
We assume that labor is perfectly mobile among sectors within each region but is immobile 
between regions.  Thus, wages will be equal across sectors within each region, but will generally 
not be equal between regions. In the long run, labor supply is completely inelastic and is determined 
by the exogenous rate of population growth.  Long run wages adjust to move each region to full 
employment.  In the short run, however, nominal wages are assumed to adjust slowly according to 
an overlapping contracts model where wages are set based on current and expected inflation and on 
labor demand relative to labor supply.  The equation below shows how wages in the next period 
depend on current wages; the current, lagged and expected values of the consumer price level; and 
the ratio of current employment to full employment:  
(1)  
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The weight that wage contracts attach to expected changes in the price level is α5 while the weight 
assigned to departures from full employment ( L ) is α6.   Equation (1) can lead to short-run 
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unemployment if unexpected shocks cause the real wage to be too high to clear the labor market.  
At the same time, employment can temporarily exceed its long run level if unexpected events cause 
the real wage to be below its long run equilibrium. 
The Government 
We take each region's real government spending on goods and services to be exogenous and 
assume that it is allocated among inputs in fixed proportions, which we set to 1996 values.  Total 
government outlays include purchases of goods and services plus interest payments on government 
debt, investment tax credits and transfers to households.  Government revenue comes from sales 
taxes, corporate and personal income taxes, and from sales of new government bonds.  In addition, 
there can be taxes on externalities such as carbon dioxide emissions.  The government budget 
constraint may be written in terms of the accumulation of public debt as follows: 
(1)  ttttttt TTRGBrDB −++==&  
where B is the stock of debt, D is the budget deficit, G is total government spending on goods and 
services, TR is transfer payments to households, and T is total tax revenue net of any investment tax 
credit. 
 
We assume that agents will not hold government bonds unless they expect the bonds to be 
paid off eventually and accordingly impose the following transversality condition:  
(2)  ( ) 0)(lim )(  = esB snsR
 s
−−
∞→  
This prevents per capita government debt from growing faster than the interest rate forever.  If the 
government is fully leveraged at all times, (2) allows (1) to be integrated to give: 
(3)  ( )dseTRGTB tsnsR
t
t
−−−∞ −−= ∫ ))(()(  
Thus, the current level of debt will always be exactly equal to the present value of future budget 
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surpluses.16 
 
The implication of (3) is that a government running a budget deficit today must run an 
appropriate budget surplus as some point in the future.  Otherwise, the government would be unable 
to pay interest on the debt and agents would not be willing to hold it.  To ensure that (3) holds at all 
points in time we assume that the government levies a lump sum tax in each period equal to the 
value of interest payments on the outstanding debt.17 In effect, therefore, any increase in 
government debt is financed by consols, and future taxes are raised enough to accommodate the 
increased interest costs. Other fiscal closure rules are possible, such as requiring the ratio of 
government debt to GDP to be unchanged in the long run.  These closures have interesting 
implications but are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Financial Markets and the Balance of Payments 
The eight regions in the model are linked by flows of goods and assets.  Flows of goods are 
determined by the import demands described above.  These demands can be summarized in a set of 
bilateral trade matrices which give the flows of each good between exporting and importing 
countries.    
 
Trade imbalances are financed by flows of assets between countries.  Each region with a 
current account deficit will have a matching capital account surplus, and vice versa.18  We assume 
asset markets are perfectly integrated across regions.19  With free mobility of capital, expected 
returns on loans denominated in the currencies of the various regions must be equalized period to 
period according to a set of interest arbitrage relations of the following form: 
                     
16 Strictly speaking, public debt must be less than or equal to the present value of future budget surpluses.  For 
tractability we assume that the government is initially fully leveraged so that this constraint holds with equality. 
17 In the model the tax is actually levied on the difference between interest payments on the debt and what interest 
payments would have been if the debt had remained at its base case level.  The remainder, interest payments on the base 
case debt, is financed by ordinary taxes. 
18 Global net flows of private capital are constrained to be zero at all times – the total of all funds borrowed exactly 
equals the total funds lent.  As a theoretical matter this may seem obvious, but it is often violated in international 
financial data. 
19 The mobility of international capital is a subject of considerable debate; see Gordon and Bovenberg (1994) or 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980). 
 
 
 
38
 
(1)  
E
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k
j
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&µµ ++  
where ik  and ij are the interest rates in countries k and j, µk and µj are exogenous risk premiums 
demanded by investors (calibrated in the baseline to make the model condition hold exactly with 
actual data), and Ekj is the exchange rate between the currencies of the two countries. 
 
Capital flows may take the form of portfolio investment or direct investment but we assume 
these are perfectly substitutable ex ante, adjusting to the expected rates of return across economies 
and across sectors. Within each economy, the expected returns to each type of asset are equated by 
arbitrage, taking into account the costs of adjusting physical capital stock and allowing for 
exogenous risk premiums. However, because physical capital is costly to adjust, any inflow of 
financial capital that is invested in physical capital will also be costly to shift once it is in place.  
This means that unexpected events can cause windfall gains and losses to owners of physical capital 
and ex post returns can vary substantially across countries and sectors.  For example, if a shock 
lowers profits in a particular industry, the physical capital stock in the sector will initially be 
unchanged but its financial value will drop immediately. 
Money Demand 
Finally, we assume that money enters the model via a constraint on transactions.20 We use a 
money demand function in which the demand for real money balances is a function of the value of 
aggregate output and short-term nominal interest rates: 
(1)  iPY = MON ε  
where Y is aggregate output, P is a price index for Y, i is the interest rate, and ε is the interest 
elasticity of money demand. The supply of money is determined by the balance sheet of the central 
bank and is exogenous.  
                     
20 Unlike other components of the model we simply assume this rather than deriving it from optimizing behavior.  
Money demand can be derived from optimization under various assumptions: money gives direct utility; it is a factor of 
production; or it must be used to conduct transactions.  The distinctions are unimportant for our purposes. 
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Assessing the Model 
 All models have strengths and weaknesses and G-Cubed is no exception.  Its most important 
strength is that it distinguishes between financial and physical capital and includes a fully integrated 
treatment of intertemporal optimization by households, firms and international portfolio holders.  
This allows the model to do a rigorous job of determining where physical capital ends up, both 
across industries and across countries, and of determining who owns the physical capital and in 
what currency it is valued.  Overall, the key feature of G-Cubed is its treatment of capital, and that 
is also what most distinguishes it from other models in either the macro, trade or CGE literatures. 
 
 G-Cubed also has other strengths.  All budget constraints are satisfied at all times, including 
both static and intertemporal budget constraints on households, governments and countries.  Short-
run behavior captures the effects of slow wage adjustment and liquidity constraints, while long-run 
behavior is consistent with full optimization and rational expectations.  In addition, wherever 
possible the model’s behavioral parameters are determined by estimation, which is discussed further 
in Chapter 4 of McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2001). 
 For the 2 country model used in the remainder of this paper, the parameter estimates are 
aggregated from the underlying 12 sectors to 2 sectors using output shares as weights. Also the 
initial values of foreign debt of each country are set to zero in the prototype model to preserve 
symmetry. 
 
 
Figure 1 : Permanent Versus Temporary OECD wide Equity Risk Premium Shocks
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Figure 2: US versus OECD-Wide Equity Risk Premium Shocks - Results for US and China
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Figure 3 : Detailed Results for the US for OECD Wide Temporary Risk Premium Shocks
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Figure  4: Optimal Policy Response in United States to OECD risk Shock : Inflation/Employment versus Inflation
Source: MSG3 Model version O50
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Figure 5: Results for  France for OECD-wide Temporary Risk Premium Shocks with optimal policy
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Figure 6: Results for  France for Temporary US Risk Premium Shocks with optimal policy
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Figure 7: NonCooperative Versus Cooperative Policy Response in United States to OECD risk shock
Source: MSG3 model version O50
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Figure 8: NonCooperative Versus Cooperative Policy Response in Europe to OECD Risk Shock
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